Tag Archives: fraud

My Church Security – Security Incident, Help!

Jim, I’m enjoying the blog and other content, but your not going to believe this, we were just starting to implement some security capabilities and we had / have an security incident aka “situation” aka “crisis”. Help quick, please.  As Dave Ramsey says all the time related to his Baby Steps, let’s put the structured design work “on pause”.  Here are some very basic steps to consider, knowing that EVERY “incident” will be different and flow in a different order.

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Note: This IS NOT meant to be followed during a life-safety emergency like a active shooter, fire, etc.  Step 1. Call 911, Step 2. Follow 911’s / Law Enforcement’s direction, Step 3. Get everyone safely to safety. Step n….

This is also NOT meant to deal with little Johnny’s boo-boo bandaid “incident”…Step 1. Get (King David) bandaid, Step 2. Implement said bandaid. Step 3. Hug Johnnie, Step 4. Call parent if Johnnie “need my mommy”

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1. Personally pray for guidance, wisdom, knowledge, peace, and for both the victim(s) and the suspect(s) and your path.

2. Develop a way to control the flow and documentation of information about the incident to the absolute need to know.  Now I am NOT suggesting any cover-up but I also do NOT believe is “total transparency”, at least not at this stage.

3. Bring together wise council, this may or may not be your board, and have each person ”rate” the level of incident on a scale of say 1-5. So you make sure people are not over or under reacting.

4. Assuming your (apotoslic) elder/deacon board is not a victim or suspect, bring them together, preferably at an offsite location to discuss next steps.  The initial critical pieces to consider: A. When to bring in outside professionals. B. Who/How do we respond to the traditional media AND SOCIAL MEDIA C. Who/How do we respond to staff, congregation, public D. Who/How will we control documentation E. Is there a need for our legal and CPA to be involved? F. – Z.

5. Has a crime been commited or is there a suspision that a crime has been committed?  I pretty strong here, call local or federal law enforcement.  Talk to them about confidentiality and communications.

6. If the security incident is confrontational in nature, determine the best way to physically AND electronically separate all parties involved.

7. Key step and assuming a crime hasn’t been comitted, if you do not have QUALIFIED, perferrably CERTIFIED, and where required by law, LICENSED security investigator and if needed, crisis management expert, get/hire ONE asap.

8. Follow the person(s)’ in step 7 direction, don’t be afraid to ask questions or challenge them, especially if they don’t understand your church’s makeup and CULTURE.

9. Keep praying, keep documenting, keep confidential, keep protecting the victims and suspects until the TRUTH comes out.

10. Upon “closure”, be transparent to your congregation AND the public (is there a difference?) to a degree that is biblical, wise, full of accountability, absolute integrity, and grace.

The #1 cause of security incidents “getting out of hand” is not following step 7 above, this isn’t about hiring me, this is about the disasters I have seen for the DIY incident / crisis / investigation management I have seen over and over.

Now, as mentioned these are BASIC steps and in future discussions we will dive deeper, not only in handling different types of security incidents (Our 2nd or 3rd episode of our podcast will cover one in detail) but also deeper dive in these basic steps.

If you have a question or need advice your current security incident, feel free to contact me through our website @ mychurchsecurity.com or askmcconnell.com.

NOTE: I can NOT provide assistance to computer intrusions, “hacks” or cyber crime.

 

My Church Security – Security = Senior Pastor Highest Priority?

When prioritizing security at a church there are a number of factors to consider when one talks about prioritization including sub-functions, training, budget, team size, team makeup, technology, area of highest concern, etc. One that I think pastors, boards, and lay people need to clearly understand is the priorities of the Senior Pastor as a minister/employee and where security fits. As some of you may know, I have a ministry that privately and publicly honors pastors, supports hurting pastors and teaches lay people why/how to honor pastors. One of the key causes of church challenges is putting too much, including security, on the pastor(s) and not properly honoring them and supporting them. In 2004, my pastor spoke one of the most profound messages for the local church on “What’s My (meaning, his) Job?” and “What Your (meaning me) Job?”. Recently he updated the message and focused on explaining what are his (as a pastor) priorities. 1. Pray, 2. Teach, 3. Appoint, 4. Be a good husband, father.

What? Where is SECURITY? He is right, as a PASTOR / MINISTER, security should not be his/her highest priority, NOW as the “CEO” / President of the business of the church, security should A (not THE) high priority. But using Priority #3 in my pastor’s message, his priority, as a PASTOR, towards security, should be to make sure he/she APPOINTS qualified and called leader(s) to lead the security function.

So if you feel qualified and called to lead or help build your church’s security function then proactively connect with your senior pastor and please don’t expect him/her to be involved day-to-day. Now, keeping him/her informed of the plan and program and gathering his/her input, wisdom, and perspectively is a must.

Enjoy, Share, Secure,

Jim

My Church Security – Church Security Plan Template

The core starting point of designing and implementing a security department or fraud department is to “level-set” where you are today with a SIMPLE inventory.  One of my most asked about tools is available FREE on the site.  There is a MS Excel version, Mac Numbers version of the file and How-To Video.  As I get feedback on the template/checklist, I will be updating it.  My hope is it is SIMPLE and should take no more then a hour or 2.

The core use of the template is to have your security focal point (that could be the person in the mirror) start by completing it to the best they can/have knowledge then gather information he/she is not privy to.  The key is to be brutly honest here with yourself.  The initial goal is to get it in a form to take the first DRAFT to the senior leadership.  There may be reviews along the way, but the key to success of baselining the organization is to make sure it is reviewed WITH the elder/deacon/overseers board.  Don’t just forward the (partially) completed template to them via email and say, “hey what do you think”……bad idea. Get in a room face-to-face and be honest.  This is not meant to solve world hunger, its meant to get everyone on the same playing field.

The left side of the template is general functions that MAY or MAY NOT exist or be needed.  The need for each function will be discussed in future blogs.  The top columns are guides to establish your organizations level of knowledge (of the existance or need) and maturity of each area.

Pull the file down and listen/watch my boring video and just get started.  Again don’t worry if you don’t understand a particular technical term, eventually we will get every row completed.

Subscribe to our awesome mailing list to receive our free template

? The Scope – “Logs fail to secure networks”

Another post in my ? The Scope series:

This is not meant to target the author or the vendor or the publisher of the content in question. Thus why I purposefully don’t link to the article. My issue is how we (looking in the mirror), as security professionals and security vendors, continue to try and educate a wide audience of (non-security) people with words and terms that are confusing and technically inaccurate or incomplete and many times not practical across the audience we are addressing and even borderline deceptive. Nevermind F.U.D. factors.

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I read a recent article that said “Logs fail to secure networks” – It was a good overview and I understand the spirit of what is being said/sold…..but….I ? The Scope. (Fighting for all the little logs in the world…..)

The author is advocating use of PCAP (technology), which I’m good with, but to make it sound like logs are significantly less valuable then PCAP, problem. I also hope he didn’t mean NetFlow…..allow me to ? The Scope:

“Why logs fail to secure networks”

1. A person I highly respect, once said a profound statement: “Networks were meant to pass traffic, not do security” so unless “networks” was defined by the author, I would disagree with his statement. Logs were never designed to ‘secure a network’ that isn’t meant to be secure in the first place.

2. Securing a technical environment (systems, devices, applications, software, network transmission stuff, etc.) requires, as we all know, a strong combination of preventative, detective, and corrective controls. Logs are critical to securing an environment in the detective control arena.

“logs rarely support an effective response to ….APT.”

Without a definition / scope of the author’s term “logs”, I would disagree. Properly configured and secured and reviewed logs many times are MORE effective in response to an APT (Threat = “Intent” remember, but that’s another post). PCAP capture (and NetFlow) in “a large enterprise” is usually setup in a way that it ultimately becomes a SAMPLE of traffic, a very valuable SAMPLE if the scope of the coverage is comprehensive.

“logs are prone to sabotage”

1. Sure if you don’t secure them to the same confidentiality, integrity, and availability controls and policies you enforce for all your other critical data….

2. Maybe not cost effective at some scale, but I have seen people just write the logs directly to DVD-R or equivalent read-only media. Simple solution and tada, limits the vulnerability of “sabotage”. Let’s not forget about PROBABILITY here. I just met a vendor recently that their primary product is highly scalable, high integrity, 100 year data (log) retention.

3. So PCAP logs / storage aren’t “prone to sabotage”?

4. Hackers usually aren’t that good to cover ALL their tracks (if they actually knew where their tracks were kept). And they are usually are coming to get something or place malware, their not planning on coming back usually….call it passive information theft….

“logs [are] a dubious source of information when the issue at hand is an advanced threat”

1. First thing when I have a system / application / device compromise is getting all the admins to secure whatever logs they have available. Can I trust the integrity of these logs? They are what they are. Would I ask for PCAP (and NetFlow), sure, but the likelihood of significant historical PCAP for a specific victim environment is much lower then system/application/device logs.

2. Will I verify the scope and integrity of the logs during my incident response process, absolutely.. Will I verify the same for the PCAP/NetFlow data, even more, yep.

3. Threat = Intent not compromise

“But there’s one thing a hacker can’t exploit. And that’s the wire.”

1. Wow, guess that rules out an insider with a pair of scissors.

2. So MitM attacks aren’t an exploit. Oh sorry, Jim, he said “wire”, not traffic.

3. Saving that quote for my next seminar. Good one.

“PCAP has the unique advantage of being completely inaccessible to hackers when properly implemented”

1. “completely” is a pretty all inclusive word, that’s putting a lot of trust in the vendor, or sysadmin of the PCAP capture infrastructure.

2. Logs also “have the unique advantage of being completely inaccessible to hackers” when properly implemented

3. Taps are never vulnerable either right?

“physically isolated network enclave”

1. Not very practical in a distributed enterprise (my definition)

“Applications write just enough information in their logs to support diagnostics”

1. Correct, if you configure them that way. Applications can also be configured to record EVERY keystroke and EVERY screen and replay them. Not sure a SAMPLED PCAP can match that. PCAP replay isn’t exactly perfected.

“produces a source of information that is incomplete and sometimes vague or irrelevant to an incident response investigation”

1. For 20+ years of doing incident management/response, I haven’t found a properly configured log and many times not so properly configured log, that wasn’t incredibly valuable to the response. By the way, just the identification that the log is not properly configured, is hugely valuable to the risk awareness of a victim organization/person.

2. I have also found that many times PCAP, to be completely useless also. That data, many times brought NO context or able to establish what is historical normal for how an environment operates.

“every byte”

1. Anyone out there collecting “every byte”……

“gives incident responders a complete, forensic view into the state of the network at any time”

1. E-N-C-R-Y-P-T-I-O-N = problem with PCAP, let of a problem for logs

2. “forensic”, as it, let’s take this PCAP data to court, really

3. state of the network – anyone visited an enterprise NOC lately….that’s the state of the network.

“Logs are expensive to manage”…..”PCAP may require a more expensive storage solution”

1. No comment

“When you switch to PCAP, you manage between one and a dozen sensors as opposed to a hundred applications”

1. The article started with working with a “large enterprise”…..so a large enterprise will need a maximum of a “dozen sensors” thus we only need to collect from a dozen network taps. And a “large enterprise” has just a “hundred applications”. Wow, need to rethink my definition of “large enterprise”

2. How’s those 10Gig Taps coming….

“Ultimately, logs are diagnostic tools for systems and applications. They are not security tools, and they will not facilitate an effective response to a breach”

1. Speechless. If that is the case, just turn off all the logs in your “large enterprise” for lack of security value. Let me know how that movie ends.

BTW: “Threat’ = intent, not actual compromise. and I would want Logs+PCAP+NetFlow if I had a choice.

Please security professionals (looking in the mirror myself here) and security vendors, let’s pause before we write this stuff and ? The Scope

Jim